LBAC has prevailed in another appeal before the Ninth Circuit. On January 26, 2024, in a published opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the state and federal claims brought by Adrianna Holt and her mother alleging that the Orange County Sheriff’s Department unlawfully searched their home and arrested them in connection with the criminal activity of Ms. Holt’s boyfriend. Appellants argued that several intertwined tolling provisions protected their claims from dismissal and, even absent those tolling provisions, the Court should grant them equitable tolling. The Ninth Circuit rejected those arguments and instead, adopted the arguments advanced by LBAC holding that all claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation and not subject to the tolling provisions of the supplemental jurisdiction statute.

On August 3, 2021, the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the County of Orange and against Vanessa Hamilton in her racial discrimination and retaliation action. Appellant argued that the District Court erred in holding that there was no causal nexus between her “protected activities” and the County’s adverse actions against her and that the District Court further erred when it denied her motion to enlarge time to conduct discovery and denied her motion to tax costs. The unanimous opinion adopted all of the arguments that advanced by LBAC, including that the record did not support Appellant’s contention that she was selected to work a mandatory overtime shift on account of her previous lawsuit against the County or that she was terminated on account of her previous lawsuit or “verbal protects” regarding the mandatory overtime shift assignment. The Ninth Circuit further agreed that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to re-open discovery and that Plaintiff waived her right to appellate review of the imposition of costs.

On March 29, 2021, the Central District of California granted summary judgment to the County of Los Angeles and Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department Homicide Detectives in Dominique Evans, et al. v. County of Los Angeles, et al. Plaintiffs, who were prosecuted for a 1997 cold case gang murder in Altadena, but ultimately acquitted, alleged that the County and two of its detectives, as well as the City of Pasadena and one of its detectives, fabricated evidence and coerced witnesses. Notwithstanding that several witnesses recanted their testimony, LBAC successfully argued that the remaining witness testimony and undisputed facts were sufficient to support the criminal court’s findings of probable cause and, therefore, Plaintiffs’ federal Section 1983, malicious prosecution, Bane Act, conspiracy, and false imprisonment claims failed as a matter of law.

On April 14, 2020, in Alliance for Constitutional Sex Offense Laws, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, et al., Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 20STCV12138, Mike Allen successfully opposed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order seeking to enjoin the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department from conducting the in-person periodic check-ins of sex offenders required under the registration requirements of the Sex Offender Registration Act. The proposed class of petitioners, convicted sex offenders seeking to avoid the required in-person check-ins during the remainder of the COVID19 pandemic, argued that the in-person check-ins put them in added danger of contracting COVID19. In addition to identifying the various safeguards employed by the Sheriff’s Department to prevent the spread of COVID19 during the check-in process, Mr. Allen pointed out that the Legislature, in drafting the Sex Offender Registration Act, specifically noted that sex offenders need to be readily available for police surveillance “at all times” because they were deemed likely to commit similar offenses in the future. In light of that, it was emphasized that, granting the relief requested by the petitioners would severely restrict the ability of the Sheriff’s Department to enforce the registration requirements of the law, which are for the public benefit and safety. Following the rejection of the application, Mr. Allen was able to successfully negotiate a voluntary dismissal of the lawsuit.

In a decision dated March 24, 2020, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the granting of summary judgment and the awarding of attorneys’ fees in favor of the County of Ventura in Spangler v. County of Ventura, et al. Plaintiff had alleged Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in a case arising out of a police chase involving a Ventura County Deputy Sheriff and Plaintiff’s adult son, who was observed riding a motorcycle and committing multiple traffic violations. While attempting to evade the Sheriff’s Deputy, Plaintiff’s son drove off a roadway and over a hillside, resulting in his death. On appeal, Plaintiff asserted that the District Court did not apply the proper standard in ruling on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim and erred in sanctioning Plaintiff for continuing to pursue frivolous claims. In the March 24, 2020 decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision on all grounds, holding that the District Court correctly applied the “purpose-to-harm” standard in evaluating Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim and did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees in favor of the County of Ventura.

On January 23, 2020, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment claim against the County of Los Angeles in Sakamoto, et al. v. County of Los Angeles. In this case, an elderly man was arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence and detained for approximately 12 hours in the County jail before being released with a citation. His family members filed suit, alleging failure to protect, after the man failed to return home and was subsequently found dead not far from the jail. After obtaining voluntary dismissals of several state law claims and judgment on the pleadings for the remaining state law wrongful death claim, Raymond Sakai successfully obtained summary judgment as to the sole remaining Section 1983 claim by demonstrating that the County had no notice that the man would be unable to care for himself if released. In affirming the decision, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that no County employee acted with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger, precluding liability against the County.

On April 19, 2019, Mike Allen and Jin Choi successfully obtained an Order granting summary judgment as to all claims brought against the County of Los Angeles in a wrongful conviction case, Paul Blumberg vs. County of Los Angeles, et al. The lawsuit, which was filed in 2010, was a hard fought case over almost eight years of Central District of California and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals litigation. In addition to finding that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the United States Supreme Court decision in Heck v. Humphrey, the Court also held that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to any alleged “Brady” violation. The Court also granted summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s state law claim for false imprisonment and held that the federal claims against the individual County Detective who handled the underlying criminal investigation were also barred by qualified immunity.

In an unpublished decision dated July 24, 2018, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Equal Protection and Due Process claims brought by various Plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Santa Monica and various individual Santa Monica employees in Miller v. City of Santa Monica, et al. Plaintiffs asserted that they had the right to operate a parking garage in the City of Santa Monica, but that that the City arbitrarily deprived them of their right to a permit, as well as the right to appeal the denial of the permit without affording them due process. Plaintiffs further alleged that the City’s actions deprived them of their equal protection rights. Mike Allen and Rocco Zambito obtained a dismissal of each of Plaintiffs’ claims at the District Court level. In the July 24, 2018 decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision to dismiss all claims, finding that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege a constitutionally protected Due Process claim because their purported “right” to operate the parking garage was based on a “contractual” right between them and a third party and, under the relevant City ordinances, the City had wide discretion whether to approve or deny permits to operate parking garages. The Ninth Circuit further held that the Equal Protection claims failed because Plaintiffs could not establish that they were intentionally treated differently from other “similarly situated” individuals. The ruling is a significant victory for the City of Santa Monica as Plaintiffs were asserting that they were damaged in excess of $10 million.

On April 4, 2018, LBAC obtained summary judgment in favor of a Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Detective in Tammy Cameron v. Lauren Brown. Plaintiff alleged a Fourth Amendment violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Detective Brown and the County of Los Angeles, alleging she was arrested without probable cause. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the Detective and Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claim against the County.

The case arose from Plaintiff’s 2013 arrest based on a warrant drafted by Detective Brown in 2007. The warrant was obtained after a robbery victim identified Plaintiff during a photographic lineup as one of the attackers. Plaintiff alleged that the photographic lineup was unduly suggestive and the identification of her was unreliable. In 2016, LBAC secured summary judgment in favor of the Detective by demonstrating that the victim’s identification of Plaintiff was reliable and established probable cause. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that a reasonable jury could find that the lineup identification did not establish probable cause. On remand, LBAC argued that Detective Brown was entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct did not violate a clearly established right. The District Court agreed and again granted summary judgment in Defendant’s favor.

On July 28, 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of the consolidated class action matters Baeza v. Baca and Corral v. Baca. In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the district court did not abuse its discretion in decertifying the classes, dismissing the cases for lack of prosecution, and denying the plaintiffs’ request to reinstate their claims. Because the district court had certified damages claims on behalf of tens of thousands of inmates who alleged that they were forced to sleep on the floor of County jails, the Court’s ruling on appeal represents a significant victory in favor of the Sheriff’s Department and the County.

On June 5, 2018, Managing Shareholder Paul Beach and Associate Charlie Wang successfully defeated a motion for an injunction in a capital murder prosecution involving the death of a law enforcement officer. The criminal defendant sought to enjoin the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department from investigating the defendant’s incarceration activities, which were relevant to upcoming law and motion practice. After extensive briefing, multiple court appearances, and oral argument, the Court denied the motion for the injunction, which will result in the matter being adjudicated in a more fair and timely manner.

Description goes hereOn April 4, 2018, LBAC obtained summary judgment in favor of a Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Detective. Plaintiff alleged a Fourth Amendment violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Detective Brown and the County of Los Angeles, alleging she was arrested without probable cause. The case arose from Plaintiff’s 2013 arrest based on a warrant drafted by Detective Brown in 2007. The warrant was obtained after a robbery victim identified Plaintiff during a photographic lineup. Plaintiff alleged that the photographic lineup was unduly suggestive and the identification of her was unreliable. In 2016, LBAC secured summary judgment in favor of the Detective by demonstrating that the victim’s identification of Plaintiff was reliable and established probable cause. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that a reasonable jury could find that the lineup identification did not establish probable cause. On remand, LBAC argued that Detective Brown was entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct did not violate a clearly established right. The District Court agreed and again granted summary judgment.

On February 28, 2018, Christina Sprenger and Daniel Cha obtained a dismissal with prejudice in Mitchell v. County of Orange. In the false arrest case, Plaintiff alleged that the arresting officer failed to conduct a thorough investigation prior to Plaintiff’s arrest regarding an incident involving improper touching of a minor. In the underlying criminal case, a jury found Plaintiff innocent after Plaintiff argued that he was wrongfully arrested based on the officer’s reliance on statements.

On February 9, 2017, Paul Beach and Natalie Price obtained a defense verdict for the County of Los Angeles in a USERRA case. Plaintiff alleged that his military service while employed by the Sheriff’s Department was a motivating factor in his failure to promote to Sergeant. Plaintiff sought back-pay, retroactive contributions to his retirement plan, and attorneys’ fees.

At trial, LBAC argued that Plaintiff’s scores on the Sergeant’s examinations were inadequate to guarantee promotion and, instead, placed him in a secondary competitive hiring band within his Division. LBAC further argued that while Plaintiff had taken several, lengthy deployments as a Naval Reserve Officer, the Sheriff’s Department highly values military service and does not use military deployments against employees when evaluating them for promotion. The jury deliberated for approximately 20 minutes before returning a unanimous verdict in favor of the County. Mitchell Jones v. County of Los Angeles, USDC Case No. 13-5306 DSF (AJWx).

On December 1, 2016, David Lawrence, Christina Sprenger and Daniel Cha secured dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action brought by former Major League Baseball player and World Series champion Lenny Dykstra. Dykstra v. County of Los Angeles et al., LASC Case No. BC541436. Mr. Dykstra had been incarcerated in the Los Angeles County Men’s Central Jail in April 2012 after pleading guilty to state law crimes involving the use of false financial information to obtain vehicles; federal charges for bankruptcy fraud remained pending. Mr. Dykstra alleged that approximately six deputies entered his cell without any justification or provocation, and proceeded to beat him to the point of unconscious. He further alleged that, as a result of the beating, he lost all his teeth. Mr. Dykstra also claimed he was denied medical care and suffered other deprivations. Mr. Dykstra named the County and numerous deputies and non-sworn jail employees as defendants. Defendants maintained that no force was used when Dykstra was taken from his cell. Rather, he had been found incoherent in his jail cell and transported to a local hospital. Once there, he became combative and was subjected to a limited use of force to subdue him after he nearly kicked a nurse in the head. Defendants were dismissed in stages throughout the litigation, including after a successful Motion for Summary Judgment, in which LBAC applied a Venegas argument to obtain dismissal for the County. See, Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th 820 (2004) and County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Peters), 68 Cal. App. 4th 1166 (1998). One week before trial was scheduled to commence, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the sole remaining defendant.

Description goes hereOn November 8, 2016, USDC Judge George H. Wu granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Fontana and Fontana Police Chief Rodney Jones in Navarro v. City of Fontana, Case No. 15-cv-1650-GW (GJSx), an unlawful seizure and excessive force case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Fontana police officers made contact with Plaintiff in a motel parking lot, where he was walking with his wife and his three children. During the officers’ interaction with Plaintiff, he appeared to swallow some drugs that he had in his pocket.

Plaintiff alleged that the officers used excessive force to unlawfully detain, search, and arrest him. Plaintiff also alleged that the City and Police Department maintained a custom of unlawful seizures and unreasonable force, inadequately training their officers, and ratified unlawful conduct of their officers. On summary judgment, LBAC argued that Plaintiff’s nolo contendere plea to violating Penal Code § 148 barred those claims under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and judicially estopped him from pursuing those claims. As to Plaintiff’s Monell claim, LBAC argued that Plaintiff had no evidence that the City or Chief Jones were deliberately indifferent or that they ratified the allegedly unlawful conduct. The Court adopted all of LBAC’s arguments, granted the Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety, and entered judgment in favor of the City and Chief Jones.

On February 23, 2016, the firm obtained summary judgment in favor of the County of Los Angeles and a detective in a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 false arrest case. Plaintiff was arrested for involvement in a violent, strong-arm robbery. In granting summary judgment, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Deveraux v. Abbey claim (deliberately fabricated evidence). The Court held that, as a matter of law, the arrest warrant was valid and the photographic lineup was not suggestive.

In July 2015, the Los Angeles County Superior Court ordered the County of Los Angeles to disclose approximately 215,000 CHP 180 Reports generated since 2012. The CHP 180 Reports were prepared by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department to document the impoundment of vehicles driven by unlicensed drivers. The reports contained personal information about the legal owners of the vehicles. The County of Los Angeles requested LBAC to seek appellate review of this order. After oral argument by Jin S. Choi before Justices Baker, Kriegler, and Mosk, the California Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate directing the Superior Court to set aside its order and enter a new order prohibiting disclosure of the 215,000 CHP 180 Reports. In the unanimous published opinion, the Court of Appeal held that the CHP 180 Reports were exempt from disclosure under Government Code § 6254(k) because Government Code § 6254.1, Vehicle Code § 1808.21, and the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act prohibit the disclosure of personal information contained in DMV records. County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Anderson-Barker), 242 Cal.App.4th 475 (2015).

On December 10, 2015, the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the City of Downey, its police department, Chief of Police, and several officers as to the plaintiffs’ 1983 lawsuit alleging unreasonable use of deadly force. On the evening of February 22, 2010, Steven Bours was walking, screaming, and occasionally kneeling in the middle of Paramount Boulevard in the City of Downey. Downey police officers attempted to contact and subdue Mr. Bours, but he physically resisted. After the application of a Taser, the officers safely placed Mr. Bours in handcuffs. Paramedics were called to the scene and Mr. Bours was taken to a local hospital for evaluation and treatment. A subsequent toxicological screening test was positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines. Then, on March 20, 2010, during the evening rush hour, Mr. Bours was walking in the traffic lanes of Paramount Boulevard toward Imperial Highway. Mr. Bours was carrying an axe and several witnesses called 911. Two nearby Downey police officers responded. Mr. Bours walked up to the hood of the stopped police vehicle, ignored repeated orders to drop the axe, and then moved around the front of the vehicle to the passenger side. At that point, both officers fired their weapons, and Mr. Bours fell to the ground. Paramedics arrived within five minutes, and Mr. Bours was transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead. A subsequent toxicological blood test revealed amphetamine and methamphetamine.

Mr. Bours’ parents brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging the use of excessive force and resulting violations of constitutional rights during both incidents. Steven Bours’ two minor children were later added to the lawsuit through a guardian ad litem. Plaintiffs’ claim of violation of a First Amendment right of association, claim of wrongful death, and the children’s claim for violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 were dismissed on December 11, 2012 pursuant to a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. On January 8, 2013, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of all claims and defendant officers based on the February 22, 2010 incident. On February 13, 2013, pursuant to another Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the estate of Steven Bours’ claim under California Civil Code § 52.1 was dismissed.

Defendants then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment relating to the use of deadly force, based in large part upon the police vehicle’s dashboard recording of the incident, as well as materially similar legal precedent. On April 16, 2013, the District Court granted the motion and thereafter entered judgment in favor of all defendants. Plaintiffs appealed the February 13, 2013 granting of judgment on the pleadings as to Steven Bours’ claim under California Civil Code § 52.1 as well as the granting of summary judgment. Plaintiff argued that the District Court incorrectly analyzed the viability of Steven Bours’ claim under California Civil Code § 52.1, and on summary judgment had improperly weighed the evidence. Plaintiffs also argued that the officers’ 19 separate orders to drop the axe (made at gunpoint) were insufficient warnings of the potential use of deadly force. David Lawrence of LBAC represented the Defendants at oral argument. Plaintiff has petitioned the Ninth Circuit for en banc rehearing; that request was denied.

On September 28, 2015, the Ninth Circuit issued an Opinion in favor of Orange County in an SVP case alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Rhoden v. County of Orange et. al, Case No. SACV08-00420 MWF (SSx). Plaintiff was a repeated sex offender, and had been convicted of a series of rapes he committed in California and Tennessee in the 1980s. After completing his criminal sentence, he was detained at Coalinga State Hospital awaiting trial of his civil commitment pursuant to the SVPA (Welfare & Institution Code §§ 6600 et seq.). In the civil lawsuit, Plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to various punitive and retaliatory treatment by Deputies at the Orange County Men’s Jail while housed there from April 2004 until April 2006. After a jury trial and unanimous verdict in favor of all County Defendants in December 2012, Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the District Court improperly granted summary judgment on his claims that jail staff withheld his legal mail, transferred him to a smaller cell in retaliation for filing grievances and the civil rights complaint, and confiscated his legal documents which impeded his right to access the courts by hindering his civil rights claims. In addition, Plaintiff argued that the District Court abused its discretion by allowing evidence at trial of his prior convictions and SVP status.

On March 23, 2015, United States District Court Judge Dean D. Pregerson granted final approval of a settlement in Peter Johnson v. County of Los Angeles, U.S.D.C. Case No. CV 08-03515 DDP (SHx), which is a class action case for injunctive relief brought by mobility impaired inmates in the Los Angeles County jails. The settlement was the result of lengthy and complex settlement negotiations, and it results in an equitable compromise between the Plaintiffs’ initial demands and the County’s interests. The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department maintains policies and procedures to provide mobility impaired inmates with the same programming and services as non-mobility impaired inmates, and will complete construction of ADA compliant housing in the jails. Paul Beach and Justin Clark negotiated the settlement for the County and will continue to assist the County in ensuring that the parties meet the terms of the settlement.

On March 23, 2015, United States District Court Judge Dean D. Pregerson granted final approval of a settlement in Peter Johnson v. County of Los Angeles, U.S.D.C. Case No. CV 08-03515 DDP (SHx), which is a class action case for injunctive relief brought by mobility impaired inmates in the Los Angeles County jails. The settlement was the result of lengthy and complex settlement negotiations, and it results in an equitable compromise between the Plaintiffs’ initial demands and the County’s interests. The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department maintains policies and procedures to provide mobility impaired inmates with the same programming and services as non-mobility impaired inmates, and will complete construction of ADA compliant housing in the jails. Paul Beach and Justin Clark negotiated the settlement for the County and will continue to assist the County in ensuring that the parties meet the terms of the settlement.

On August 19, 2007, Plaintiff called the police regarding an altercation with his elderly father-in-law. When police officers arrived, they saw the elderly father-in-law on the floor in a pool of blood. A broken glass candlestick holder was found nearby. The Plaintiff claimed that his father-in-law attacked him with a cane and that he had struck his father-in-law in self-defense. The father-in-law and mother-in-law told the police that the Plaintiff, without provocation, struck the father-in-law in the head with the candlestick holder. The police then arrested the Plaintiff for assault with a deadly weapon. Later that day, the Defendant officer (represented by LBAC) who had arrested Plaintiff, met Plaintiff’s estranged wife at the hospital. She accused Plaintiff of possessing illegal drugs; the Defendant officer provided his cell phone number in case she found any drugs belonging to the Plaintiff. She called the Defendant later that evening regarding drugs she said she found in her husband’s vehicle. The Defendant and a sergeant went to the home, obtained the drugs, and booked them into evidence. The Defendant and the wife then began a sexual relationship.

A different Defendant detective conducted additional investigation of Plaintiff, and the District Attorney’s Office eventually filed assault and elder abuse charges against Plaintiff, as well as drug possession charges. The drug charges were dismissed at the preliminary hearing, but Plaintiff was held to answer on the assault related charges. Eventually, the Defendant officer’s sexual relationship with the Plaintiff’s wife was revealed, but the prosecution proceeded to trial. The Plaintiff was acquitted and the Defendant officer was fired from the police department. The

Plaintiff then filed his lawsuit in state court against the Defendant officer, the Defendant detective, his by-then ex-wife, and the City of Glendale for false arrest and malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. LBAC represented the Defendant officer, while the Glendale City Attorney represented the Defendant detective and the City of Glendale.

The case was removed to federal court and LBAC moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other grounds, that there was probable cause to believe that the Plaintiff had assaulted his father-in-law and that there was no valid claim for malicious prosecution under Section 1983. It was argued that the relationship between the officer and the Plaintiff’s wife was irrelevant since the arrest occurred prior to the commencement of any relationship. The City of Glendale and the Defendant detective separately moved for summary judgment as well. In December 2012, the District Court granted summary judgment as to the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and remanded the state law claims, which were eventually dismissed voluntarily by Plaintiff. The Plaintiff appealed the granting of summary judgment to the Ninth Circuit. After oral argument by David Lawrence of LBAC on behalf of the Defendant officer and Anne Maurer of the Glendale City Attorney’s Office on behalf of the Defendant detective and the City of Glendale, the Ninth Circuit issued a published opinion on March 5, 2015 affirming the District Court’s granting of summary judgment, holding that Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate the absence of probable cause, thereby defeating his false arrest and malicious prosecution claims. The Ninth Circuit also held that the drug charges did not result in an arrest, and that, to the extent that Plaintiff was subject to own-recognizance release conditions amounting to a Fourth Amendment seizure, the conditions were identical to those imposed as a result of the assault-related charges for which there was probable cause

In May 2014, the Ninth Circuit issued an Opinion in favor of Los Angeles County in a false arrest case. Plaintiff was arrested twice (1989 and 2009) on a felony warrant seeking the arrest of another person. After being detained at the Los Angeles County jail on both occasions, he was ultimately exonerated. The only discrepancies between his description and the warrant were a one-inch height difference, a ten-pound weight difference, and a different address. The warrant did not include any numeric or biometric identifiers, nor was it updated after his 1989 arrest to indicate that he had previously been cleared on the warrant. During his 2009 detention, The District Court granted summary judgment for the County, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment in a published opinion, holding that the Fourth Amendment particularity clause does not require an arrest warrant to include numeric or biometric identifiers, so long as it includes sufficient information to identify the warrant subject to the reasonable exclusion of others. The Ninth Circuit further held that Sheriff’s Department personnel were not obligated to investigate Plaintiff’s identity because he reasonably matched the warrant description, and Plaintiff’s due process rights were protected because he was brought to court the day after his arrest and thereafter remained in custody pursuant to the Superior Court’s remanding order.

On March 27, 2014, Dennis M. Gonzales and a team of associates obtained a defense verdict following a jury trial. The case was brought by a plaintiff who alleged that he was subjected to excessive force while he was incarcerated at Men’s Central Jail.

In February 2014, David Lawrence, Christina Sprenger and Allen Li successfully ended an injunction governing disabled inmates housed in the Orange County jail system. The injunction was the result of a class action brought in 2001 on behalf of past, present and future disabled pre-trial detainees, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and similar state laws. In 2005, the matter went to trial before the Honorable Judge Gary L. Taylor, and the County prevailed on all issues. Judge Taylor vacated the 1978 Stewart injunction and Plaintiffs took an appeal. In an Amended Opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently found that certain, unidentified violations of the ADA existed within the Orange County jail system, and remanded the case back to the District Court for a second trial. With the retirement of Judge Taylor, the case was reassigned to the Honorable Judge Audrey B. Collins, who entered an injunctive relief Order in June of 2011, outlining physical modifications and programmatic changes to be made in the Orange County jail system. Judge Collins also appointed a monitor to track the County’s compliance with the Order. In August of 2013, the County moved to

terminate injunctive relief pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion to extend injunctive relief based on the monitor’s numerous findings of non-compliance in the areas of inmate identification, classification, visitation, grievances, and recreation. On February 12, 2014, the Court issued an Order adopting the County’s arguments, and terminated injunctive relief noting that the County had carried its burden of proof and injunctive relief was no longer necessary.

On August 27, 2013, David Lawrence and Daniel Cha obtained a defense verdict before a Riverside federal jury in Forbes v. Villa, Case No. SACV11-01330 JGB (ANx). Plaintiff had a twenty year history of neck and back injuries and surgeries, including numerous fusions and implantation of hardware. Plaintiff, who was cuffed and shackled, claimed that a Sheriff’s Deputy slammed him against a wall, threw him to the floor and kneed him in the back at the Fullerton North Court holding cell area in retaliation for attempting to communicate with a friend who was a protective custody inmate. Plaintiff claimed injuries to his face and exacerbation of his neck and back injuries resulting in two surgeries approximately one year thereafter. In addition to general damages, Plaintiff sought almost $800,000 in medical expenses. The deputy maintained that plaintiff refused to respond to his commands to return to a holding cell and that he grabbed Plaintiff by the arm and shirt and began to lead him to the cell when Plaintiff tripped over the chain connecting the shackles and fell. The deputy held onto Plaintiff and kept him from falling completely to the floor, assisted him to his feet, and walked him to his cell without further incident. After deliberating for approximately one hour, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of the deputy after a week-long trial.

On May 3, 2013, Dennis M. Gonzales and a team of associates obtained a defense verdict in Lopez v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC 460074, following an 8-day jury trial in a wrongful death action arising from a fatal deputy-involved shooting. An off-duty Los Angeles Sheriff’s Deputy fatally shot and killed decedent after decedent ignored the deputy’s commands and instead reached into his waistband. Although a subsequent investigation revealed the decedent only had a screwdriver in his front pants pocket, LBAC argued that the deputy had observed a metallic object which he believed to be a weapon.

At trial, the defense successfully used Dr. Kris Mohandie’s testimony regarding third party witnesses’ statements, as well as exhaustive information on the decedent’s medical and criminal history, to opine that the decedent’s actions were consistent with a “suicide-by-cop”. LBAC convinced the jury to accept the deputy’s testimony that he feared for his life and that the shooting was a “suicide-by-cop”. A defense verdict was returned after one hour of deliberations.

On August 27, 2013, David Lawrence and Daniel Cha obtained a defense verdict before a Riverside federal jury in Forbes v. Villa, Case No. SACV11-01330 JGB (ANx). Plaintiff had a twenty year history of neck and back injuries and surgeries, including numerous fusions and implantation of hardware. Plaintiff, who was cuffed and shackled, claimed that a Sheriff’s Deputy slammed him against a wall, threw him to the floor and kneed him in the back at the Fullerton North Court holding cell area in retaliation for attempting to communicate with a friend who was a protective custody inmate. Plaintiff claimed injuries to his face and exacerbation of his neck and back injuries resulting in two surgeries approximately one year thereafter. In addition to general damages, Plaintiff sought almost $800,000 in medical expenses. The deputy maintained that plaintiff refused to respond to his commands to return to a holding cell and that he grabbed Plaintiff by the arm and shirt and began to lead him to the cell when Plaintiff tripped over the chain connecting the shackles and fell. The deputy held onto Plaintiff and kept him from falling completely to the floor, assisted him to his feet, and walked him to his cell without further incident. After deliberating for approximately one hour, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of the deputy after a week-long trial.

On May 3, 2013, Dennis M. Gonzales and a team of associates obtained a defense verdict in Lopez v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC 460074, following an 8-day jury trial in a wrongful death action arising from a fatal deputy-involved shooting. An off-duty Los Angeles Sheriff’s Deputy fatally shot and killed decedent after decedent ignored the deputy’s commands and instead reached into his waistband. Although a subsequent investigation revealed the decedent only had a screwdriver in his front pants pocket, LBAC argued that the deputy had observed a metallic object which he believed to be a weapon.

At trial, the defense successfully used Dr. Kris Mohandie’s testimony regarding third party witnesses’ statements, as well as exhaustive information on the decedent’s medical and criminal history, to opine that the decedent’s actions were consistent with a “suicide-by-cop”. LBAC convinced the jury to accept the deputy’s testimony that he feared for his life and that the shooting was a “suicide-by-cop”. A defense verdict was returned after one hour of deliberations.

Plaintiff Lawtis Donald Rhoden was held in custody as a civil detainee at the Orange County Jail from 2004 through 2006 while awaiting a probable cause hearing under California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act. Plaintiff claimed that his conditions of confinement violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause because they were less considerate than the conditions afforded to criminal detainees, deputies had unlawfully searched his cell and discarded his personal property, he was denied adequate nutrition and medical care, and deputies had retaliated against him for submitting inmate grievances. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the case proceeded to trial on Plainitff’s claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement, retaliation, and inadequate medical care against eleven remaining Defendants. At trial, LBAC argued that Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement as a whole were in fact more considerate than the conditions afforded to criminal detainees, and that Plaintiff had never been denied adequate medical care. On December 11, 2012, after one hour of deliberations, the jury returned a unanimous defense verdict. Plaintiff is currently appealing the judgment to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Plaintiff Paramjit Singh was detained by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement on May 18, 2011. The next day, he was turned over to the custody of the Orange County Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff alleged that he was assaulted by an unknown deputy as he was booked into the Orange County Jail, and was not permitted to wear a turban (which is a tenet of his Sikh religion). Plaintiff’s lawsuit was brought against the County of Orange and Sheriff Hutchens in her official capacity, seeking monetary damages and equitable relief under state law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) – 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. LBAC filed a Demurrer and Motion to Strike the First Amended Complaint on several grounds. As to Plaintiff’s state law claims, Defendants argued that the application of statutory immunities barred Plaintiff’s state law claims, and that the lack of a damages remedy for an alleged violation of the free exercise clause of the state constitution barred his claim for damages. With regard to Plaintiff’s federal claims, Defendants argued that under Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th 820 (2004), California Sheriffs act on behalf of the state, rather than the county, and that California Sheriffs are therefore entitled to the state’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from § 1983 actions. Defendants extended that rationale to actions brought under RLUIPA. The Court sustained Defendants’ Demurrer and granted the Motion to Strike, with leave to amend. After Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint, Defendants brought another Motion to Strike which was granted in its entirety, leaving only Plaintiff’s claim of assault against the unknown Doe deputy. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the remainder of his case.

Plaintiffs, a group of Orange County bail bondsmen, alleged that the Sheriff and the Sheriff’s Department used high-ranking gang members (“shot-callers”) to maintain order and facilitate the operation of the Orange County Jails. Plaintiffs alleged that as part of this scheme, the shot-callers were permitted to steer newly arrested inmates to certain bail companies in exchange for “kickback” incentives, which were then used to finance gang operations. Plaintiffs brought a lawsuit for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) seeking injunctive relief as well as millions of dollars in damages for lost business profits. LBAC successfully dismissed Plaintiffs’ case on a Motion for Summary Judgment. Thereafter, Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals where Ms. Sprenger argued that the dismissal was proper. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on June 13, 2012. Mehr v. County of Orange, 2012 WL 2129391 (9th Cir. 2012).

Plaintiff John Zabasky alleged that the District Attorney’s Office wrongfully re-filed criminal charges against him in an effort to assist American International Group, Inc. and American Home Insurance Co. in gaining a strategic advantage in a prior civil lawsuit. Plaintiff alleged his civil rights were violated under § 1983 and sought to recover the costs of defending against the criminal action, the loss of value to his company, and emotional distress. The District Attorney’s Office filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the District Attorney’s Office was acting on behalf of the State, rather than the County, when it filed charges against Plaintiff. The district court granted the motion, dismissing the action with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that it was acting as a State office in prosecuting Plaintiff and was, therefore, immune under the Eleventh Amendment.

This case arose from a report of suspected battery. When deputies responded to the scene, they found the plaintiff, Joshua Radwan, and his crying girlfriend. The deputies separated Plaintiff and his girlfriend, based upon suspicion of physical abuse. Deputies searched Plaintiff and found a small amount of marijuana in his possession. Deputies searched his vehicles and located three knives. A criminal history check indicated that Plaintiff was out on bail for robbery. One database indicated that he was not to possess firearms while another database stated he was not to possess firearms or other weapons. Unable to resolve the conflict, deputies arrested Plaintiff. The actual court order only precluded him from possessing firearms. Summary judgment in favor of the defense on the false arrest aspect of the case was granted. When deputies searched Plaintiff prior to transporting him to jail, he refused to stand still and was generally uncooperative. Deputies took Plaintiff to the ground and tased him in “drive stun” mode. When he arrived at the jail, he complained that he could not walk as a result of leg restraints having been applied too tightly. He was carried into the booking area where he remained uncooperative and was deemed a booking process delay. Consequently, he was taken to a medical observation cell where most of his clothing was removed while being subjected to various control holds. The process was videotaped and Plaintiff cried out in pain throughout. After a little over three hours of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict on July 1, 2011, in favor of the seven deputy defendants.

This unlawful search and excessive force case arose from a neighbor’s early-morning report that a gunshot was heard at Plaintiff’s home. Orange County Sheriff’s Deputies responded to Plaintiff’s home to ascertain whether anyone had been shot. Based on prior contacts with Plaintiff, the deputies knew that Plaintiff had firearms in her residence. Plaintiff refused to allow the deputies inside. Eventually, the deputies forced the front door open, knocking Plaintiff to the ground. The deputies searched the home, and after confirming no one was injured and that none of the firearms appeared to have been discharged, the deputies left. Plaintiff was subsequently charged by the Orange County District Attorney’s Office with violating Penal Code § 148(a)(1) – resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer. During the pendency of the criminal case, Plaintiff brought a Motion to Suppress Evidence under Penal Code § 1538.5, arguing that the deputies lacked a warrant or exigent circumstances to enter Plaintiff’s home. The criminal court denied Plaintiff’s motion, holding that the deputies’ entry into the home was reasonable. Subsequently, the criminal court dismissed the charge, because there was no evidence that Plaintiff used physical force against the deputies. Plaintiff then brought her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against the deputies and the County of Orange, alleging that they unlawfully entered her home and used unreasonable force. The District Court dismissed Plaintiff’s action on a pretrial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, which argued that Plaintiff’s action was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, because the state criminal court previously decided that the deputies’ actions were lawful. Plaintiff has filed an appeal with the Ninth Circuit, which is pending. Brown v. County of Orange, Case No. CV 10-3928 VBF(JEMx), Ninth Circuit case number Case No. 11-55897.

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Theo Lacy Jail Facility in Orange County California, was involved in a scheme to smuggle messages and contraband between inmates at the jail. As several deputies began a search of inmates, Plaintiff ran from the deputies and threw a packet containing heroin, tobacco, and messages underneath a door. When Plaintiff resisted the deputies’ attempts to restrain him, the deputies used pepper spray and a Taser to secure Plaintiff in handcuffs. Plaintiff was subsequently charged and convicted for possession of an illegal substance in jail, and for resisting a peace officer. Plaintiff was still incarcerated when he filed his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit, which alleged that he suffered severe injuries as a result of the incident, that he was denied medical attention until hours after the incident, and that deputies had refused to file his administrative grievances. LBAC filed a Motion to Dismiss of the deputies’ behalf, arguing that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, because Plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing his lawsuit. The District Court agreed, and dismissed Plaintiff’s lawsuit. Plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and LBAC obtained an affirmative ruling in Omar Villicana v. Orange County Sheriff’s Department, 471 Fed.Appx. 604, 2012 WL 699045 (9th Cir. 2012).

This federal wrongful death case was brought by decedent’s wife and two daughters. Decedent Russell Cotton was 62 years of age at the time of his death at the Santa Barbara County Jail. During the three-week period prior to his death, decedent began behaving bizarrely, threatening members of his family, and having bizarre delusions. During that time period, prior to his final incarceration, he was involuntarily committed pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code § 5151, was released from the hospital because of threats he was making, and was arrested and released and again arrested and released. On November 6, 2002, the Santa Barbara Sheriff’s Department and the Mental Health Assessment Team (MHAT) were on the lookout for decedent. He was located and taken to Lompoc Hospital at which time the on-call psychiatrist for the Santa Barbara County Alcohol, Drug and Mental Health Services was contacted, i.e., Dr. Irwin Lunianski, who ordered that decedent be medically cleared at the hospital and then taken to the Psychiatric Health Facility (PHF). Decedent subsequently kicked out the rear window of the MHAT vehicle, was arrested and taken to jail. At the jail, plans were made to eventually transfer decedent to the PHF; however, due to the potential for injury to decedent and those transporting him, a number of deputies would be required and the transfer was delayed. On November 7, 2002, decedent was being moved from an observation cell to another wing of the jail when he suddenly turned and started walking away from the custody deputy, stating “No.” That deputy shoved decedent against the wall to gain control and a struggle ensued involving a number of custody deputies. Deputies eventually subdued decedent and placed him in an observation cell, un-handcuffed. Shortly thereafter, deputies noticed that he was unresponsive and was turning blue. Decedent’s heart beat was restored and he was then taken to Cottage Hospital where he died several days later. The claim against Dr. Lunianski (the defendant represented by LBAC) was that his alleged deliberate indifference to decedent’s serious medical needs [heart disease and COPD] resulted in the death. Plaintiffs argued that Lunianski should have admitted decedent to the PHF where he would have been sedated and the subsequent fight with deputies would not have occurred. Lunianski denied having refused decedent admission to the PHF and LBAC obtained a jury verdict in Lunianski’s favor on May 7, 2010. See Cotton v. County of Santa Barbara, Case No. CV 03-07652 PSG (RZx).

Plaintiff Mortimer was a detainee at the Los Angeles County Jail pending trial on a rape charge. On August 14, 2000, Mortimer was acquitted by a jury and released from jail twenty nine hours after the entry of a court order authorizing his release. Plaintiff subsequently sued Sheriff Leroy Baca claiming a policy or custom of deliberate indifference which caused a violation of his constitutional right to be released within a reasonable time after the basis for his detention had ended. Notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit’s pronouncements about Plaintiff’s alleged over-detention in Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2004), the “law of the case” doctrine did not preclude the District Court from entertaining Baca’s motion for summary judgment since the Ninth Circuit did not directly address the issue of deliberate indifference and since substantially different evidence was adduced in the subsequent motion, a recognized exception to the “law of the case” doctrine. The District Court considered a variety of measures taken by the Sheriff’s Department designed to reduce the time necessary to release inmates and concluded that the evidence did not support a finding that Plaintiff’s over-detention was the result of a set of policies-or lack of policies-that amounted to a policy of deliberate indifference. Consequently Sheriff Baca could not be held liable in his official capacity. See Mortimer v. Baca, 594 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 2010).

In June 2004 plaintiff Avalos was arrested by Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputies on an Orange County warrant for domestic abuse but Los Angeles County failed to notify Orange County of Plaintiff’s arrest. Over two months later the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) realized that Plaintiff had been over-detained and should be released. At the time of his release, LASD risk management personnel negotiated a $500 settlement with Plaintiff, Plaintiff later received the settlement check and signed a full release and settlement agreement. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued claiming violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as a result of his over-detention and his allegedly involuntary waiver. He also claimed that defendants conspired and engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of RICO by fraudulently, oppressively, extortionately, or with threats duped Plaintiff and others similarly situated into compromising their monetary claims for sums far less than those claims were worth. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and was upheld by the Ninth Circuit since Plaintiff failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find defendants had a policy, practice or custom of over-detaining inmates. LBAC argued that Plaintiff also failed to show an independent violation of the Constitution as a result of the alleged improper efforts to block his access to the courts. The Court further held that even if such a right exists, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity since the right was not clearly established. Finally, summary judgment in favor of defendants on Plaintiff’s RICO claim also proper since a predicate act that might support a finding of a pattern of racketeering activity was absent and since plaintiff offered no evidence of a specific injury to a business. See Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. 2009).

On October 23, 2009, a federal jury rendered a defense verdict in a police excessive force case entitled Olvera v. Weidenkeller, CV 06-07585. Here, Orange County deputies arrested Plaintiff when they found him smoking methamphetamine in a car with an acquaintance. While handcuffing the male suspect, Plaintiff punched the deputy in the jaw and the deputy pepper sprayed Plaintiff. After placing Plaintiff in handcuffs, Plaintiff slipped the cuffs to the front of his body and somehow broke the rear window out of the police car and crawled out. After a struggle, the deputies re-applied Plaintiff’s handcuffs and placed Plaintiff in leg restraints. Plaintiff was convicted on a variety of charges and served four years in prison until his writ of habeas corpus was granted. The Office of the District Attorney decided not to re-try the criminal case, and this suit followed. It originated as a false arrest, malicious prosecution, and excessive force case. A number of defendants including the District Attorney and Sheriff were dismissed before trial along with all causes of action except the federal excessive force claim against one individual defendant. After a four day trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the deputy.

In his first three months with LBAC, Dennis Gonzales won back-to-back jury trials. First was a federal civil rights excessive force case entitled Fuller v. County of Orange, et al.. CV 04-6851 SVW (PJwX). Plaintiff claimed that, following his arrest for DUI by the California Highway Patrol, he was beaten by Orange County Sheriff’s Deputies while being booked into the Orange County Jail. On April 16, 2009, a federal jury returned a defense verdict after deliberating for one hour.

Two months later, Dennis tried and won another civil rights excessive force case in state court entitled Santos v. City of Culver City, et al. BC 372574. Plaintiff in that case was a juvenile who was seen “tagging” by Culver City police officers. Plaintiff claimed that during the pursuit that ensued, he was struck on the head and back with a baton or flashlight causing two large lacerations to his head and back injuries. The officers claimed that plaintiff injured his head while running through a dense thicket. On June 26, 2009, a jury returned a defense verdict after deliberating for an hour and a half.

Following a narcotics investigation, the Watch Commander for a Sheriff’s substation learned that a citizen who claimed to be a bystander to the investigation had been hospitalized with injuries to his head and back, claiming that he had been assaulted by a uniformed deputy. An internal investigation immediately commenced and deputies who were part of the operation were instructed not to leave work before speaking to internal affairs investigators. Soon thereafter, deputies were advised that they were also the subjects of an internal criminal investigation. While the deputies waited at the station to be interviewed, they were told to remain in the report writing room, the basement roll call room, and then the COPS team office, all of which were unlocked. The deputies were never placed under arrest, physically restrained, or otherwise touched or subjected to the use of force, and they later received overtime pay for staying at the station after their regular shift had ended. Eventually, each deputy was interviewed by the lead criminal investigator and each deputy declined to provide a statement on advice of counsel. None of the deputies under suspicion could initially be cleared of wrongdoing, and they were each then reassigned from their respective duties to station duties pending completion of the ongoing criminal investigation. The deputies filed suit against the Sheriff, other supervisory officers, and internal affairs investigators claiming the detention at the station amounted to an impermissible seizure under the Fourth Amendment, that their Fifth Amendment rights against self incrimination were violated, and that their reassignments violated their rights under the Due Process Clause. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The Ninth Circuit affirmed holding that a supervisor does not offend the Fourth Amendment by ordering a subordinate to remain at the station after the termination of his shift to submit to questioning about the discharge of his duties as a peace officer. No seizure occurred since the deputies’ decisions to remain at the designated location did not stem from the fear that if they tried to leave they would be physically detained but only that they might suffer some adverse employment consequences. No Fifth Amendment violation occurred since the deputies were not compelled to answer questions or to waive their immunity from self incrimination. Nor was reassignment sufficient to create a Fifth Amendment violation since it is not equivalent to losing one’s job. Furthermore, since no incriminating statements were used in any criminal proceeding, there could be no Fifth Amendment violation. Finally, there was no Due Process violation since punishment for failure to make a voluntary statement does not shock the conscience nor run counter to the decencies of civilized conduct. Aguilera v. Baca, 510 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2007).

On January 18, 2007, a Norwalk jury returned a verdict in favor of the City of Downey and two of its police officers in a high profile “suicide by cop” wrongful death case in Martinez v. City of Downey, et. al, Case No. BC 277402. The suit arose from a high-speed vehicle pursuit following an attempt to stop the decedent for suspected driving under the influence. After decedent crashed during the pursuit, officers approached the car on foot to arrest decedent, who then tried to run down an officer with his car prompting shots from three separate officers. Thereafter, decedent resumed the vehicle pursuit until police eventually pinned decedent’s car into parked vehicle on a city street. A stand-off ensued, with decedent ignoring numerous commands to exit the car, put his hands in the air, and surrender. Approximately eleven minutes after his car was pinned, decedent opened the driver’s door and stepped out of the car wearing an unzipped jacket and directly facing the officers. Officers ordered decedent to put his hands in the air. Decedent raised his right hand, placed a cigarette in his mouth, and then reached with his right hand underneath the rear portion of his jacket towards the waistband area. Believing that the decedent was reaching for a weapon, three officers fired upon the decedent. One officer fired fifteen rounds from an MP-5 sub-machine gun. Another fired two “bean-bag” rounds and a third fired one round from a .9 millimeter handgun, killing the decedent. No weapon was found on the decedent.

Plaintiffs, decedent’s parents, disputed the claim that decedent placed his hand behind his back. On the evening of the shooting, Plaintiffs came to the police station to find out if the decedent was their son and reported that the decedent had an alcohol problem for ten years. The father also stated that the night before the shooting, he had gotten into an argument with decedent over decedent’s drinking, during which decedent said “before I embarrass the family, I will die.” At trial, Plaintiffs denied having made these statements. Defense counsel David Lawrence successfully argued that the decedent intentionally precipitated his own death, i.e., “suicide by cop.”

On June 29, 2006, LBAC, with David Lawrence as trial counsel, obtained a federal jury defense verdict in a case alleging violations of various fair housing laws under both state and federal law. At the crux of the case was an attempt in the mid to late 1990s by a Pomona City Councilperson to assist an organization of property owners in a drug and crime ridden area of Pomona. The unofficial organization was dubbed “KKAPS” which constituted the first letters of the streets encompassing the area. The unofficial KKAPS’ spokesman, Wilfred Keagy, was also a defendant but settled prior to trial. Plaintiffs, an African American property manager, Grace Cross, and a non-profit fair housing organization, Inland Mediation Board, claimed that the City through it Councilperson, aided KKAPS and created an agency relationship by preparing KKAPS agendas and mailers, sending them out on City stationary, having City officials attend the meetings, arranging for a place for the meetings on City property, and a variety of other services. Plaintiffs claimed that the City, through KKAPS, encouraged discrimination against African American tenants by the use of “code words” such as the “wish well list” which was a list of prior tenants of the area who had either left without paying rent or under other adverse circumstances. On one occasion, Mr. Keagy allegedly made remarks at a meeting attended by Ms. Cross that African Americans should not be rented to since they were the source of the problems in the neighborhood. Ms. Cross, deceased at the time of trial, claimed that she was frightened by the statements and tenor of the meeting and moved away from Pomona. In addition to their direct claims of discrimination, Plaintiffs claimed disparate impact and presented evidence of changes of racial composition in the KKAPS area, which was rebutted by the defense demographer. After ten days of trial, the federal jury found in favor of the City on all claims. The City had offered $100,000 to settle the case and the plaintiffs’ last demand was $1,048,579.

In May 2006, LBAC successfully convinced the U.S. Supreme Court to rule in favor of the County of Los Angeles, and reverse the Ninth Circuit in Ceballos v. Garcetti. Ceballos, an employee of the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s office, brought suit under § 1983, alleging that County employees retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. Specifically, Ceballos alleged that he was retaliated against for a memorandum he drafted arguing that an affidavit police used to obtain a critical search warrant was inaccurate.

LBAC and the County prevailed in the preliminary stages of the case after the District Court granted the County’s summary judgment motion, finding no protected First Amendment speech interest in the memorandum because Ceballos wrote it in a purely job-related capacity, pursuant

to his employment duties. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the memorandum was entitled to First Amendment protection because it was on a matter of public concern, and found that Ceballos’ speech interests outweighed the government’s interests in promoting workplace efficiency and avoiding workplace disruption.

The U.S. Supreme Court granted LBAC’s petition for certiorari. The case was argued twice before the Supreme Court, first while former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was on the bench and again after Justice Samuel Alito Jr. took her place. Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, holding that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes and thus the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). This Supreme Court victory has positive and far-reaching implications for all of LBAC’s clients!

In November and December of 2004, David Lawrence and Christina Sprenger represented the County of Orange in a trial before the Honorable Gary L. Taylor in the consolidated actions Pierce v. County of Orange, Case No. SACV 01-981 GLT(MLGx), and Stewart v. Gates, 450 F. Supp. 583 (C.D. Cal. 1978). The class action suit brought on behalf of all pre-trial detainees at the Orange County jail alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and its State law equivalent, Title 15 and the 1978 Stewart injunction which imposed inmate population limits on the jail and a variety of restrictions relating to outdoor exercise, seating in holding cells, time allotted to finish meals, visitation, access to legal materials, day room access, access to telephones, unsupervised visitation with minors, receipt of mail, minimum sleep times before and after going to court, access to blankets, and the right to a bed within 24 hours of arrival at the jail. At one point in the protracted litigation, the court certified a damages class action in addition to an injunctive relief class action. The firm successfully persuaded the court to de-certify the damages aspect of the class action before trial. Following a bench trial, the court issued its April 27, 2005 findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Pierce matter, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to prove any pervasive violations. In a separate 23 page order, Judge Taylor vacated the 1978 Stewart injunctions and dismissed the case, noting that “the minimum standard Stewart orders have outlived their time, and are unnecessary and no longer appropriate.”

On September 1, 2004, a federal jury returned a defense verdict in favor of a Manhattan Beach Police Officer accused of racial profiling. What began as a racial profiling case against multiple officers, the City of Manhattan Beach, and its Chief of Police, was narrowed when the district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants except the officer who initiated the traffic stop. Thereafter, both sides sought and were granted the right to take interlocutory appeals. The cross-appeals resulted in the Ninth Circuit upholding in district court’s rulings in Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, 329 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2003). The two day trial that followed featured the testimony of Lonni Ali, the wife of Muhammad Ali. The plaintiff is the life-long friend and personal photographer of Ali. Muhammad Ali was in attendance during his wife’s testimony and closing arguments.

On January 9, 2004, David Lawrence obtained a defense jury verdict for former Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department officials in what seemed like a battle that would never end. The case arose from the February 8, 1991 arrest of Brett Thompson in which a Sheriff’s canine bit Mr. Thompson. The arrest was criticized in the original Kolts report as an example of instances in which additional force was used to subdue criminal suspects who were bitten by and fought with the canines. Orders granting defense motions for summary judgment were reversed twice by the Court of Appeals, accounting for the length of time required to get the matter to trial. By the time the case was tried, Plaintiff had dismissed all but high ranking Sheriff’s officials including the former Undersheriff. Plaintiff proceeded against the remaining defendants on a civil rights “failure to train and supervise” theory, but after almost five weeks of trial in Los Angeles County Superior Court, the jury returned a defense verdict with only one dissenting juror.